Our joint symposium on the next ICC Prosecutor continues. Ewan Brown is Senior Analyst at the Commission for International Justice and Accountability; his prior service includes appointments as head of the Military Analysis Team at the ICTY-OTP, as Darfur Team Leader at the ICC-OTP and as an officer in the British Army. William H. Wiley is the Executive Director of CIJA; he has also served variously as an intelligence analyst, investigator and legal advisor with the Canadian war-crimes program, the ICC-OTP, the ICTY-OTP, the ICTR-OTP and the Iraqi High Tribunal, in addition to his service as a Canadian Army officer. Be sure to also read Kate Vigneswaran and Melinda Taylor at Opinio Juris.

The collapse of the prosecution cases against Mr. Laurent Gbagbo and Mr. Charles Blé Goudé constituted the latest serious setback for the ICC’s Office of the Prosecutor (OTP) which, since 2003, has experienced a great deal more defeat than victory. Factors unique to any given casefile will explain why (i) an investigation does not give rise to a prosecution and, where allegations are brought before a panel of judges, (ii) the prosecution fails to see charges confirmed and convictions registered. That noted, a consistent pair of shortcomings invariably inform unsuccessful ICC-OTP investigations and prosecutions: an insufficiency of evidence as well as the failure of the OTP to assess properly such prima facie evidence which it has chosen to adduce.
It is undoubtedly the case that the reasons for this undesirable state of evidentiary affairs do not all lie with the OTP. The OTP is often compelled to operate within politically unstable environments which present significant physical-security challenges; to its credit, over the last two to three years the OTP Investigations Division has responded deftly to these realities, often through increasing cooperation with non-State actors, including private investigative entities, which have shown themselves to be capable of collecting information of ostensible probative value. That noted, Gbagbo and other prosecutorial failures would suggest that the OTP continues to struggle in its efforts to conform to the highest standards of information-cum-evidence collection planning, collection management and evidence review. This post will address in turn each of these pillars of successful international criminal investigations and prosecutions.
Evidence Collection Planning
The practice of international criminal and humanitarian law (ICHL) has long distinguished between crime base and linkage evidence, with OTPs – including that of the ICC – showing, in most cases, a marked inclination towards the over-collection of crime base materials and the under-collection of linkage information with evidentiary value. This injurious practice reflects the failure of the profession of international criminal investigations and prosecutions to implement rigorous evidence collection planning protocols. If the ICC-OTP does not address this shortcoming, it will continue to see a great many of its investigations and prosecutions come to grief.
Crime Base Evidence
Crime base evidence is used to satisfy the physical elements of the offences alleged; as such, it does not concern itself with the mental elements of crimes nor the mental and material legal requirements of the modes of liability set out in ICHL. Given its limited scope, prima facie crime base evidence is relatively easy to secure. This, in part, explains the widespread tendency towards its over-collection. For this and other reasons, not least finite-resource considerations, it is essential that crime base information-cum-evidence should be sought in accordance with properly prepared and detailed collection plans.
Linkage Evidence
Linkage evidence can be defined as that which is required to meet the mental and material elements of the alleged modes of liability as well as the mental elements of the offences. Given that, in the first instance, international criminal investigations should not be individual-target driven, and failed cases have often been the result of poor quality linkage evidence, the bulk of the initial collection effort should be assigned to ensuring a comprehensive understanding of key linkage themes, including: the relevant military, security, political and paramilitary structures and their activities; the commanders, staff officers and other key governmental, party-political and security personnel operating within these structures; the command, control and communications (C3) apparatus linking command and staff headquarters to deployed units; and the disciplinary procedures at the disposal of the command, both de jure and de facto. Within these themes it is the detail that matters and the collection of exhaustive linkage evidence needs to be fully understood by all involved. Convictions can only be gained through a fundamental understanding of linkage evidence, placing linkage collection at the heart of investigations, through the imaginative use of multiple sources and the work of professional collection managers.
The building of linkage cases against high-ranking suspects requires considerable collection and analytical capacity. However, once the functioning of the relevant structures has been understood in significant detail – an effort which should absorb the overwhelming majority of the resources assigned to a complex criminal investigation – it is a relatively straightforward matter to identify the top leaders of the said structures and, in turn, link them through the C3 arrangements to underlying criminal acts.
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