Thamil Venthan Ananthavinayagan joins JiC for this post on the Chagos Island and the self-determination of its people. Thamil, LLM. (Maastricht University), PhD (NUI Galway), is a lecturer at Griffith College Dublin since September 2017. Prior to this lectureship at GCD, he worked as a Fellow and research assistant to the Irish Centre for Human Rights in Galway, Ireland.
Colonialism has not ended – this is the brief, yet accurate description of the current state of affairs in light of the aftermath to the International Court of Justice (ICJ) Chagos Advisory Opinion (AO). In summary, the Court held that the separation of the Chagos archipelago from the British colony of Mauritius contravenes international norms, in particular the right to self-determination. More precisely, the ICJ enunciated:
(…) 177. The Court having found that the decolonisation of Mauritius was not conducted in a manner consistent with the right of peoples to self-determination, it follows that the United Kingdom’s continued administration of the Chagos Archipelago constitutes a wrongful act entailing the international responsibility of that State. It is an unlawful act of a continuing character which arose as a result of the separation of the Chagos Archipelago from Mauritius.
178. Accordingly, the United Kingdom is under an obligation to bring an end to its administration of the Chagos Archipelago as rapidly as possible, thereby enabling Mauritius to complete the decolonisation of its territory in a manner consistent with the right of peoples to self- determination. (…)
Despite this, the United Kingdom has failed to meet the obligations to complete the unfinished business of decolonisation with a deadline which was set for the 22nd of November 2019, with the Foreign Office (and hence her Majesty’s Government) quietly rejecting to abide by the AO of the ICJ. The Chagos case reveals the weaknesses of an AO – despite the moral impetus, international law is eviscerated of its force due to prevalent hegemony of powerful states, here with the existence of the United States and the United Kingdom. Postcolonial international law continues to be manipulated to serve the interests of the powerful few. It is simply a sequel to colonial international law. Second, the Chagos case reveals a far more important aspect in postcoloniality: justice cannot be achieved as long as imperialism lives an afterlife in the shadows of colonialism. To this end, this article will consider the following questions: what is the role of justice in postcoloniality? More precisely: what is the liberating force of justice in postcoloniality?
A harrowing monument of the Empire in the Indian Ocean:
The Court is the gravity centre for international justice within the United Nations systems, its prime judicial organ. However, the Chagos case has amplified the limits of international justice when faced with imperialism, which requires the heritage of its Empire to thrive and aggravate its power. French imperial theorist Jules Harmand held once
there exists a hierarchy of races and civilisations, and (…) we belong to the superior race and civilisation (…) The basic legitimation of conquest over native peoples is the conviction of our superiority, not merely our mechanical, economic, and military superiority, but our moral superiority. Our dignity rests on that quality, and it underlies our right to direct the rest of humanity. Material power is nothing but a means to that end.
Insofar as British government holds that ‘the UK has no doubt about our sovereignty over British Indian Ocean Territory (BIOT), which has been under continuous British sovereignty since 1814’ , it begs the questions: what kind of sovereignty replaced the existing one? The Chagos Islands tale is the evidence that colonialism is not only existing, but reproducing and reinforcing the structures of Western imperialism in the present. For China Mieville, by contrast, colonisation was to be understood not so much in terms of its content, but in terms of the imperialism of its form:
Colonialism is in the very form, the structure of international law itself, predicated on global trade between inherently unequal polities, with unequal coercive violence implied in the very commodity form. This unequal coercion is what forces particular content into the legal form.
It would go beyond the scope of this article to give a full picture of the colonial injustice the Chagossians had to endure (and a snapshot would not give any justice to the suffering). But it is necessary to give an idea of the origins of this suffering. Continue reading











