Alex Whiting joins us for this latest contribution in our ongoing symposium on the Next ICC Prosecutor. Alex is the Head of Investigations at the Specialist Prosecutor’s Office. He is also a Harvard Law School Professor of Practice, former ICC and ICTY prosecutor, former Assistant U.S Attorney and criminal civil rights division prosecutor. Be sure to check out Priya Pillai’s contribution to the symposium over at Opinio Juris!
The contributors to this symposium will likely agree that the ICC has failed to live up to expectations and that changes are required, urgently. They will also likely share the view that the primary mission of the ICC is to prosecute those most responsible for the crimes of genocide, crimes against humanity, and war crimes, consistent with due process norms and the rights of the accused. But how to achieve this goal? In selecting the next Prosecutor, the selection committee and Assembly of States Parties (ASP) will have to think about the strategy for change proposed by each candidate, as well as how his or her profile is suited to the task.
With respect to strategy, there may be differing perspectives on what constitutes success for the ICC. However, I will suggest one measure that should be fundamental to anybody’s approach. The ICC needs cases, meaning successful cases. More of them. Without more successful cases, none of the hopes for the ICC — deterrent, expressivist, symbolic — will be achieved. It is not enough to begin preliminary examinations or open investigations. It is not enough to make speeches or threats, issue reports, or embrace ambitious strategies. It is not enough to bring charges, if in the end nobody is arrested. The ICC is not a naming and shaming organization. It is a judicial institution that can only succeed if it has accused persons in the courtrooms. Empty courtrooms, and the ICC fails, by any measure.
That cases are essential to the ICC’s existence might seem like an obvious point, but in fact getting cases, let alone successful ones, has been a central challenge throughout the ICC’s existence. Since it came into force nearly 18 years ago, only four persons have been convicted of the ICC’s core crimes (Lubanga, Katanga, Al Mahdi, and Ntaganda, the last one currently on appeal). The trial of another accused (Ongwen) has just been completed, and the case against two others (Gbagbo and Ble Goude) was dismissed by the trial chamber, a result now under challenge by the prosecution. Two other cases (Al Hassan and Yekatom/Ngaissona) are awaiting trial. And that’s it. Having a nearly empty pipeline of cases threatens the relevance of the ICC. Without trials, states will see the institution as a failure and a waste of money, victims will become disillusioned, and potential accused will not take it seriously.
So how can the ICC get more cases? The selection committee and ASP should ask each prosecution candidate this question. The answer should begin by a commitment that every single activity by the Office of the Prosecutor (OTP) will be oriented to this goal. Every meeting, every trip, every investigative step, every staff person. The new Prosecutor should announce that if it’s not about getting more cases, he or she does not want to hear about it.
Second, the Prosecutor will have to take steps to improve the effectiveness and efficiency of the prosecution’s investigations by examining investigative strategies and priorities, methods, decision-making processes, organizational structures, staff profiles, and performance. Much of what affects the success of ICC investigations and prosecutions is outside of the court’s control, but the institution can and must do better. More on this point below.
Third, the Prosecutor should accept that in some cases it is more important to bring cases against mid-level commanders responsible for serious crimes who can be brought to The Hague, rather than high-level actors who are beyond the court’s reach. Sometimes this debate has been framed as a choice between an ambitious court and a modest one. But that is a false choice. The court has to be both. It should always aim to prosecute those most responsible and pursue those cases when it can. It should never abandon this ambition. But it must also be modest in assessing what is possible with the tools it has and in the environment in which it operates. It is not a super court, and it will not succeed by pretending to be one. If it focuses on investigations in situations or against persons where it cannot succeed, only the court will be blamed, and only the court will suffer the consequences (along with the victims whose interests will be left unvindicated). There will be no glory in failure. Continue reading










