David M. Crane joins JiC for this second post in our ongoing joint symposium with Opinio Juris on the next ICC Prosecutor. Crane was the Chief Prosecutor of the Special Court for Sierra Leone from 2002 until 2005.
I have had the rare privilege of being one of four individuals to actually found an international tribunal, literally from the ground up, and manage it to success. The international war crimes for West Africa, called the Special Court for Sierra Leone, has been taunted as one of the more successful tribunals in modern history. Why is this so? Like the tribunals for Yugoslavia and Rwanda, each was created by the United Nations with the intent to seek justice of victims of atrocity crimes, yet the Special Court for Sierra Leone stands out from the other two as being more effective and efficient.
There are several reasons—a workable mandate (greatest responsibility), the proper location (at the scene of the crimes in Sierra Leone), a strategic plan along with a prosecution plan. Stated simply the Special Court was better led and managed across the board. Additionally, as a hybrid international tribunal, the Special Court was “of the UN”, not “in the UN”. Therefore the byzantine administrative and personnel rules that is so much of the UN management system did not apply to us. The UN is simply incapable of administering international justice in an effective and efficient manner. Because the Special Court was not tied to these archaic management principles we were able to move fast, with less cost, with a lean dedicated team of people not focused on a UN career (where initiative can be frowned on) but on seeking justice for victims of international crimes. Alas, the International Criminal Court has become somewhat a clone of the UN—more form over substance. I say this with regret.
A successful Chief Prosecutor has to be a diplomat, a politician, someone who can lead and manage effectively, as well as know the law. If one of these attributes is missing it can become a problem. When I founded the Special Court, I did it with decades of diplomatic and political experience. All this came naturally to me and I used it effectively in West Africa. Additionally, I had been leading and managing organizations in the US federal government for three decades. I knew how to be a leader and manager. I was known in the US federal government as someone who could create and manage new organizations to success, to include an office that oversaw a vast majority of the US intelligence community. The then Secretary of State Colin Powell nominated me for the post of Chief Prosecutor based on this fact that I could lead and manage. As a successful leader himself this was of paramount importance to him. It was assumed that I was a good lawyer.
Internationally, there tends to be too much emphasis placed on being a good lawyer and no focus on leading and managing. Large new enterprises and organizations need to have someone that inspires, focuses the team, builds a sense of pride and purpose, all around a centralized theme of seeking justice for victims of horrific crimes. This is done by putting together a strategic plan. This plan is the sheet of music from which all the players follow to accomplish the mandate which in the case of the Special Court was “prosecute those who bear the greatest responsibility for war crimes, crimes against humanity, and other serious violations of international humanitarian law.” That is why we were there.
A strategic plan centers the team on what they are doing on a daily, weekly, and monthly basis, why they are there, and what their job is to advance the plan in seeking justice. Everyone knows the plan and works the strategic plan. The Special Court was unique of all the major tribunals for this. It simply had a plan and it worked the plan until it was finished. The Special Court was the last tribunal to start and the first to finish with great success. It was the strategic plan that made the difference, which the other tribunals simply lacked.
Another important part of an effective and efficient tribunal is an overall prosecution plan. Taking the mandate as well as the extant facts and law, a good prosecutor builds a plan on who to prosecute, how to prosecute, when to prosecute, and why to prosecute. This plan is part of the strategic plan, but it allows an Office of the Prosecutor to come to work every morning knowing exactly why they are doing something at any one given time.
A prosecution plan allows then for appropriate budgetary planning and administrative build up. It’s a “plug and play concept”. You bring on assets as you need them. You build and office around the mandate not build the mandate around the office. This allows for efficient use of personnel. The Special Court managed to successfully achieve its mandate on a fraction of the number of personnel, assets, equipment, and other items at a quarter of the cost than the other tribunals. The Office of the Prosecutor accomplished its mandate following a strategic and prosecution plan with around 70 persons versus the hundreds that walked the halls in The Hague and Arusha.
The ICC is slightly different as it is a permanent court. That presents a different approach, but success still is achieved by having a plan, as well as good leaders and managers who are equally good diplomats and politicians. The bright read thread of international criminal law is politics. It is a naive prosecutor who does not factor in the political and diplomatic ramifications of their decisions on who to prosecute, when, and why? If they don’t they will have problems, even fail. The ICC has historically had a “tin ear” to politics and their record shows for it. Continue reading










