Barrie Sander joins JiC for this four-part series on what the situation in Israel and Palestine tell us about how we understand, construct, and tell stories about international law. Barrie is Assistant Professor of International Justice at Leiden University – Faculty of Governance and Global Affairs. Click here for part one and here for part two.

Part Three – Framing and Structural Bias
What stories can international lawyers usefully tell when confronted with situations of ongoing mass violence? This is the question at the centre of this blog series, which is concerned with exploring the narrative dimensions of international law within the specific context of the current situation in Israel and Palestine. In my previous post, I began by considering the significance of analogies and comparisons – whether for learning lessons from the past or for setting expectations concerning the emancipatory potential and limits of particular fields of international law.
In this post, I consider a different narrative dimension of international law – framing and structural bias. When international lawyers look at the Israel-Palestine situation, what do they see? Reflecting on debates and disagreements amongst international lawyers in the weeks following the attacks of 7 October, Vivek Bhatt observed how the partiality of international lawyers ‘to legally selective stories in moments of crisis reveals just how closely the legal, the political, and the personal are intertwined’. Rather than an invisible college, international lawyers may be better understood as constituting a ‘divisible college’, encompassing a diversity of perspectives, traditions, and positionalities. Importantly, whenever international lawyers examine a particular crisis, it is through acts of framing that certain aspects of the situation are rendered visible and prominent, while others are marginalised and excluded.
Borrowing from Jorge Viñuales’ work on legal inquiry, techniques of framing may be understood from two perspectives. First, the ability to set the scale from which a situation is viewed – zooming in to capture particular incidents or zooming out to capture the broader context. Second, the ability to select the criteria for highlighting certain features at a given scale – the criteria of international human rights law and international humanitarian law, for example, tend to direct attention towards different, albeit at times overlapping, dimensions of a situation. It is in this way that we may speak of a certain politics of framing that can have a significant bearing on the way a situation is understood and subsequently treated.
Importantly, the scale and criteria relied upon within particular fields of international law and their attendant institutions, while always open to contestation, over time come to reflect a certain structural bias. This is understood as ‘the way in which patterns of fixed preference are formed and operate inside international institutions’. As Martti Koskenniemi explains, even if it is possible to support and contest many kinds of practices through the use of professional argument, legal institutions still prefer ‘de facto some outcomes or distributive choices to other outcomes or distributive choices’ and come to serve ‘typical, deeply embedded preferences’. As such, when reflecting on the emancipatory potential of particular vocabularies and institutions of international law, identifying their structural bias can help define what may be expected of them in practice and what may need to be challenged.
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