Kenya’s Withdrawal from the ICC – An Act in Vain?

(Photo: Reuters)

(Photo: Reuters)

Yesterday, Kenya’s Parliament voted in favour of a motion to withdraw from the International Criminal Court (ICC). In the wake of the vote, there has been some alarmist rhetoric about what Kenya’s move to withdraw from the Court means for the ICC. In yesterday’s post, I tried to dispel some of the concerns that the vote to withdraw would affect the ICC cases against Kenyan President Uhuru Kenyatta and William Ruto or that a Kenyan withdrawal would lead African states to leave the Court en masse.

But what does a potential withdrawal really mean for Kenya? Perhaps not as much as has generally been assumed. For starters, the motion does not mean that Kenya has already withdrawn from the ICC. Another bill to that effect will have to be introduced in Kenyan Parliament within the next 30 days. It will require a two-thirds majority to pass, a tall order for the Jubilee Alliance. It is far from guaranteed that such a bill will pass.

Furthermore, in a brilliant comment on the blog yesterday, Thomas Obel Hansen, an Assistant professor of international law at the United States International University in Nairobi, argued that “Parliament’s move raises more questions than it provides answers” and that it is far from guaranteed that Kenya will fully withdraw from the ICC. Obel Hansen’s comments are worth quoting in full:

First of all, it is important to point out that the motion passed was not the original one tabled in Parliament which you cite here, but an amended version, in which the sentence “further aware of a resolution of the National Assembly in the Tenth Parliament to repeal the International Crimes Act and to suspend any links, cooperation and assistance to the International Criminal Court” was deleted. This amendment, it was said during the debate, was adopted in order for Kenya not to defy its obligations towards the Court. So, on the one hand, many of the parliamentarians who took the floor yesterday said that their intention with the motion is to avoid that Kenyatta and Ruto stand trial in The Hague, but on the other hand, if this was really the intent it is surely curious that this amendment was included without much controversy (an a session that otherwise didn’t lack any drama).

(Photo: Reuters)

(Photo: Reuters)

Further, whereas the motion states that a bill will be introduced which will compel the Kenyan Government to withdraw from the Rome Statute, it is not clear that Parliament actually has the powers to do so. Kenya’s Treaty Making and Ratification Act 2012 makes it clear that it is the prerogative of the executive branch of government to initiate ratification as well as denunciation of international instruments, though Parliament must be consulted and can under certain circumstances block such decisions. So, if Parliament may only encourage the executive to initiate a withdrawal but cannot itself do so, there wouldn’t really be a need to repeat that message in an Act of Parliament to be adopted at a later stage. The motion would clearly suffice.

In contrast, if Parliament wanted to repeal the International Crimes Act (ICA), it could simply have done so by passing a bill, rather than passing a motion saying that it intends to do so within the next 30 days. Whether the ICA will be repealed will obviously depend on the outcome of the vote on such a bill, not the passing of yesterday’s motion. Continue reading

Posted in International Criminal Court (ICC), International Law, Justice, Kenya, Kenya and the ICC | Tagged , , | 10 Comments

The ICC and Kenya Parting Ways? What it Means and What it Doesn’t.

Kenyan-parliament-chairs

UPDATE: Kenyan Parliament has now approved a motion to withdraw from the ICC. A bill will be introduced to this effect in 30 days. Opposition MPs boycotted the vote. For a new post on whether the vote was in vain, see here.

By now, readers are likely well aware that Kenya’s Parliament is on the verge of voting on whether to withdraw from the International Criminal Court (ICC). This comes just days before the trial of William Ruto is set to begin in The Hague. Given the dominance of the Jubilee Alliance, which brought together Uhuru Kenyatta and Ruto (both of whom have been charged by the ICC for their alleged involvement in the 2007-08 post-election violence), it seems like a foregone conclusion that a motion to withdraw from the Court will pass. What is less clear is what that means for Kenya, the ICC, the relationship between the Court and African states, and the Kenyatta and Ruto cases.

Here is the motion being debated by Kenya’s Parliament:

That, aware that the Republic of Kenya promulgated a new Constitution on 27th August, 2010 which has fundamental changes in the circumstances relating to the governance of the Republic; aware that the Republic conducted its general elections on the 4th of March 2013 at which the President and Deputy President were lawfully elected in accordance with the Constitution of Kenya; further aware of a resolution of the National Assembly in the Tenth Parliament to repeal the International Crimes Act and to suspend any links, cooperation and assistance to the International Criminal Court ; this House resolves to introduce a Bill within the next thirty days to repeal the International Crimes Act (No 16 of 2008) and that the Government urgently undertakes measures to immediately withdraw from the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, adopted by the United Nations Diplomatic Conference of Plenipotentiaries on 17th July, 1998.

And here are a few quick thoughts on what I think it means and what I think it doesn’t.

Withdrawing won’t change the Kenyatta or Ruto cases

As the Court has made clear, regardless of whether or not Kenya withdraws, the ICC cases will go forward. Legally, withdrawing from the Rome Statute will have no effect on the trials of Ruto or Kenyatta. While the vote is a potentially potent political move, to quote Bill Pace, “Kenya gains no legal advantage by withdrawing from the ICC.” Importantly, a withdrawal would only be effective 12 months after any decision to withdraw was made.

(Photo: Reuters)

(Photo: Reuters)

Shooting themselves in the foot

To date, the ICC has not issued arrest warrants against either Ruto or Kenyatta. Instead they remain under summons to appear at ICC hearings. So far, they have cooperated with the Court. Critically, this has allowed statesmen, diplomats and heads of state to meet with Kenyatta in person. Had Kenyatta been indicted by the Court, meetings with individuals like the UK’s PM David Cameron would have been impossible.

If the vote to withdraw passes, the likelihood that the Court will issue arrest warrants increases dramatically. This is because Ruto and Kenyatta are very unlikely to continue to cooperate with a Court that their country has just voted to withdraw from. To do so would be confusing and look silly. With arrest warrants, however, Ruto and especially Kenyatta will join ranks with Omar al-Bashir as international pariahs whose diplomatic travel plans are highly limited. Continue reading

Posted in International Criminal Court (ICC), International Law, Justice, Kenya, Kenya and the ICC | Tagged , , | 24 Comments

Whose R2P Is It? The Responsibility to Protect Post-Syria

If you haven’t already, do take the time to check out the fantastic symposium on intervention in Syria over at Opinio Juris. You’ll find a host of provocative and timely posts on the subject, including great pieces by Stephanie CarvinJennifer Trahan and Peter Spiro, amongst others. Below is my contribution on the state and future of R2P in which I argue that there is an inherent and unreconciled tension between R2P as a political package of ideals and R2P as a potential legal doctrine. As a result, the current fight over R2P is not between R2P’s critics and its proponents but between its proponents themselves. R2P desperately needs conceptual consistency if it has any hope of emerging as an accepted norm in international relations. If it can’t achieve this, it risks meaning everything to everyone and therefore very little at all. And for every future Syria we will be doomed to debate what R2P is and what it isn’t at cross-purposes and ad nauseum. 

(Cartoon: Paresh)

(Cartoon: Paresh)

Who would have thought that the most pressing question regarding the Responsibility to Protect in 2013 would be: what is it? The answer to this question is as unclear today as any time in R2P’s political life. It might even be less clear.

In the midst of ongoing questions regarding the legality and legitimacy of direct military intervention in Syria, scholars and observers have passionately rehashed the main tenets of R2P, defending or castigating it depending on their political persuasions and which interventions they’ve cut their political teeth on. At the core of their debate is that pesky, simple question: what, exactly, is R2P?

The cacophony of reactions to plans of a potential military intervention in Syria by the US (perhaps with some coalition of powers) has been a déjà vu of the year 2000. There has been a lot of talk about reconciling international commitments to preserve and protect sovereignty with obligations to preserve and protect inalienable universal human rights. All of a sudden, the phrase “humanitarian intervention” is back with a vengeance. Echoing Richard Goldstone’s famous judgement regarding NATO’s intervention in Kosovo, many are suggesting that a military intervention without UN sanction being “illegal but legitimate”. Of course, it was out of this rather curious and, for many, frustrating proposition as well as the inability to reconcile universal human rights with the sovereign prerogatives of states, that the concept of R2P was born. Which begs the question: how did we get back to square one?

The early- to mid-2000s helped establish not one R2P but multiple R2Ps and these have never been sufficiently reconciled. There are two dominant and distinct versions of R2P at play. First is R2P as a package of norms. This package of norms represents liberal cosmopolitan convictions, namely that the commission of mass atrocities against individuals is of concern to all other human beings and that the sovereign inviability of states is conditioned upon their respect of individual rights and freedoms. R2P as a package of ideals is broadly appealing. NGOs, activists and key normative entrepreneurs like the UN Secretary General have been working tirelessly for over a decade to talk these norms into reality. But R2P in this context is also sometimes fuzzy. This has been made clear over the question of who can legitimately authorize R2P. If R2P is a set of principles, then it can be authorized outside of the UN Security Council. After all, the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS) stated that, in the situation where the Security Council is deadlocked, intervention by a coalition of states or a regional organization would be appropriate. Legally, however, this is highly dubious.

(Photo: AP)

(Photo: AP)

Distinct from R2P as a normative prescription for world politics is R2P as a legal doctrine. It is less fuzzy and rests primarily upon the two paragraphs in the World Summit Document, accepted by the UN General Assembly in 2005. With the experience of Iraq looming over UN member states, virtually none were inclined to support granting authority to invoke R2P outside the Security Council. And so they didn’t. Hence, whatever its merits, R2P can only lawfully be invoked through the Security Council.

R2P as law and R2P as a set of normative ideals are often in tension. But R2P is also something else. It has emerged as a language with its own vocabulary. The various reports and commissions, UN resolutions, nation state policies, and diplomatic statements are R2P’s lexicon. But as a language, R2P is a double-edged sword. All language can, after all, be used and abused. R2P as a vocabulary provides the invaluable discursive space within which any intervention is weighed against its ability to protect civilians. But it also allows its defenders and its critics to abuse the concept by pretending that R2P is something that it isn’t – or at least not yet. Continue reading

Posted in Responsibiltiy to Protect (R2P), Syria | 4 Comments

To Intervene or not to Intervene – R2P and the Murky Legal Options in Syria

James P. Rudolph joins JiC for this guest-post on R2P and the legal options for intervening in Syria. James is an attorney in Washington, D.C. and California where his work focuses on international law. He has previously written on R2P in the case of Mali. Enjoy!

Aleppo, November 2012. (Photo: AP / Narciso Contreras)

Aleppo, November 2012. (Photo: AP / Narciso Contreras)

How, in the absence of U.N. Security Council authorization, could the Obama administration, acting alone or as part of a coalition, justify the use of force under international law? This question is doubtless being bandied about by high-level officials within President Obama’s national security team, and the answer, despite protestations to the contrary from both hawks and doves, is not an easy or straightforward one.

Article 2(4) of the U.N. Charter reads as follows: “All Members shall refrain in their international relations from the        threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations.” There are only two exceptions to this otherwise ironclad edict: the use of force as authorized by the Security Council and self-defense.

If the Security Council sanctions the use of force, it does so pursuant to Chapter VII, Article 42 of the U.N. Charter, after first having decided that there exists a threat to the peace, a breach of the peace or act of aggression. “Should the Security Council consider that measures provided for in Article 41 would be inadequate or have proved to be inadequate, it may take such action by air, sea, or land forces as may be necessary to maintain or restore international peace and security. Such action may include demonstrations, blockade, and other operations by air, sea, or land forces of Members of the United Nations.”

When there is agreement regarding what constitutes a threat to the peace or act of aggression, this authorization normally is forthcoming. But there’s the rub: matters of peace and security can be devilishly difficult and divisive.  As an example, one need look no further than the Security Council as it relates to Syria’s horrifically violent civil war. Russia and China, permanent members of the Council with veto power, oppose any military intervention in Syria. Yet the U.S. and France are today in favor of a more robust response to the atrocities unfolding there. Hence the current deadlock.

(Photo: The Spectator)

(Photo: The Spectator)

The other exception to the prohibition on the use of force is self-defense. This right, which can be invoked individually or collectively, predates the United Nations and, given its importance in international affairs, is enshrined in Article 51 of the U.N. Charter. The right does not arise until after an armed attack occurs against a member of the U.N., and any such response must be necessary and proportional. In the case of Syria’s apparent use of chemical weapons, it isn’t obvious that an armed attack has occurred against a member of the U.N. To be sure, the use of chemical weapons constitutes a crime in itself, but arguing that another member of the United Nations has been attacked would, to say the least, be a stretch.

What, then, is left as an option for responding to the gross human rights violations occurring in Syria today? After all, it’s estimated that at least 100,000 people have been killed since the start of the conflict; laws of war have been flouted; and fundamental rights are being violated with impunity. Despite the apparent unavailability of U.N. Security Council authorization or the use of self-defense, there are several other options, one of which is known as the Responsibility to Protect, or R2P. Continue reading

Posted in International Law, Responsibiltiy to Protect (R2P), Syria, UN Security Council, United Nations, United States | Tagged , , , | 11 Comments

Syria: War is Looming, but is Justice Possible?

(Photo: Khalil Ashawi/Reuters)

(Photo: Khalil Ashawi/Reuters)

Dear readers,

I wanted to share an op-ed I penned for the Globe and Mail on Syria and international criminal justice. It’s no secret that, over the past few days, the UK, France and the US have begun beating the drums of war. But they have also been precariously silent on the question of justice.  Here’s a snippet of the article:

Despite two years of an incessant civil war that has claimed at least 80,000 people, the United Nations Security Council has been mired in deadlock on how to respond to the violence in Syria. Yet the images and videos of civilians attacked with chemical weapons in the outskirts of Damascus has rocked the Syrian status quo. As Jon Western suggests, the chemical weapons attack may constitute “Syria’s Srebrenica,” galvanizing the international community into taking action in a war they can no longer afford to ignore.

The massacre of 8,000 Bosnian Muslims at Srebrenica in 1995 became a crucial moment not only in the Bosnian war but for international justice. The International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia declared that the massacre at Srebrenica constituted genocide; generals and political officials have been tried and convicted for their role in the carnage.

In the case of Syria, however, there have been no calls from the Security Council for chemical weapons attacks to be investigated by the International Criminal Court (ICC). Even as UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon declared that the use of chemical weapons in Syria constituted an “outrageous crime” that could not be met with impunity, there were no calls for the Council to refer Syria to the ICC. This begs the question: if the use of chemical weapons against thousands of civilians is a crime, why the silence on Syria and the ICC?

You can read the whole post here.

Thanks for reading!

Posted in International Criminal Court (ICC), Justice, Syria | Tagged | 4 Comments

Meeting the Devil’s Advocate – An Interview with Jacques Vergès

The following glimpse into the life and mind of Jacques Vergès is brought to you by Chris Tenove. Chris is a doctoral candidate in Political Science at the University of British Columbia where his research explores the political and ethical dilemmas of global governance for international criminal justice and humanitarianism. Chris also runs an excellent blog (see here). Enjoy!

Jacques Vergès (Photo: Bourdas / SIPA)

Jacques Vergès (Photo: Bourdas / SIPA)

Last week the illustrious, despised and devilishly playful Jacques Vergès died. The French lawyer was notorious not only for the clients he defended but for the provocative tactics he used. Most recently, he had defended former Khmer Rouge head of state Khieu Samphan, now being tried at the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia. I wrote about the ECCC in its early days for Macleans, The Walrus and the Radio Netherlands World Service. I was curious to see whether Vergès might challenge the authority and the narrative of the ECCC, as he had done in previous trials. I therefore secured a meeting at his Paris home in August, 2008. I had planned to write a magazine profile or an academic paper on Vergès but never quite got to it. Re-reading my interview with him I regretted that decision. I continue to find his views on criminal trials to be provocative and interesting, as well as self-serving and sometimes cold-hearted. Vergès saw legal advocacy as profoundly creative and political, particularly if one casts off conventional views about the legitimacy of courts or the desire to have criminal trials establish the truth and provide some vindication to victims.

Before excerpting from that interview, here are a few details from Vergès’ fascinating life. Those interested in more can turn to this superb profile by Stéphanie Giry, the very good documentary Terror’s Advocate and a great character sketch in Erna Paris’ Unhealed Wounds: France and the Klaus Barbie Affair. Vergès was born in 1925 in Thailand to a French doctor and his Vietnamese wife. His father had to quit as French consul because of this interracial marriage, which helps explain Vergès’ love-hate relationship with France. He enjoyed attention from his countrymen, a refined life in Paris and the French tradition of subversive public intellectuals like Voltaire. (Vergès died in a home that Voltatire once lived in.) Yet he spent much of his life attacking the country’s mores and defending some of its enemies.

Vergès rose to fame in 1957 when he defended – and fell in love with – Djamila Bouhired, a young revolutionary with Algeria’s National Liberation Front. Bouhired was accused of planting a bomb in a milk bar in Algiers frequented by French civilians. Eleven people were killed. Vergès did not try to prove that Bouhired was innocent or seek a reduced sentence. Instead he mounted what he called “la défense de la rupture” – to defend the accused by creating a rupture in the trial itself. He did so by challenging the legality and morality of the state that mounted the prosecution, through dramatic speeches to the courtroom and the news media. In Bouhired’s case he attacked the court as a puppet of French colonialism in Algeria. Bouhired was sentenced to death but Vergès’ performance had made her a cause-célèbre. Facing a domestic and international outcry, the court stayed her execution. When Algeria became independent in 1962 she was released and proclaimed a national hero. Bouhired and Vergès together advocated for anticolonial causes, met with Mao Zedong in China, and married in 1965.

In 1970, Vergès told his wife and others that he was going to Spain. He then disappeared for seven years. He has referred to this phase, mysteriously, as the time when he stepped “into the looking glass.” Theories abound concerning his whereabouts: in Cambodia under the Khmer Rouge (I think unlikely), in Palestinian militant training camps, perhaps living invisibly in Paris, etc. When I asked when he would reveal the truth of those years, Vergès said “perhaps as a last testament.” He added with a laugh, “But for now I am in very good health.”

Jacques Vergès with Klaus Barbie (Photo: AP)

Jacques Vergès with Klaus Barbie (Photo: AP)

When Vergès reappeared he did not rejoin Bouhired and his children but became a Paris-based lawyer. He no longer focused on anticolonial struggles but defended a range of notorious clients, from enemies of the French state (Klaus Barbie and Carlos the Jackal), to African despots (Togo’s Gnassingbe Eyadema and Henri Conan Bédié of Ivory Coast), to people infected with HIV by tainted blood in France, to celebrities such as Marlon Brando’s daughter Cheyenne. While his clients were often found guilty, he reveled in the notoriety and the proximity to violence, and appears to have made a tidy income doing so.

Vergès used his rupture defense most famously in the 1987 trial of the Nazi official Klaus Barbie, known as the “Butcher of Lyon”. Barbie was accused of overseeing the murder or torture of thousands of French citizens, including Jewish children and French Resistance members such as the revered Jean Moulin. The trial of Barbie was expected to show the suffering and heroic resistance of the French under Nazi occupation. But Vergès used the trial to bring attention to war crimes that France had committed in countries it occupied after 1945, as well as to show the divisions and sometimes betrayals within the French Resistance. Barbie was convicted but Vergès’ successfully ruptured the trial’s dominant narrative.

This approach makes sense in international criminal tribunals, where the court’s legality and legitimacy are often in question. Defense lawyers often challenge the jurisdiction of international tribunals’ over their clients, and defendants such as Slobodan Milosevic have tried to create ruptures in their trials in order to tell alternate histories of events. Vergès intended to challenge the ECCC’s limited focus on crimes under the Khmer Rouge regime, ignoring the horrific American bombing of Cambodia before 1975 and the later involvement of China and Vietnam in the country (see below). I haven’t watched the trial of Khieu Samphan closely, but several people have told me that Vergès’ performance was not particularly impressive or effective.

The Interview: August 6, 2008.

I met Vergès at his private residence and office on a quiet street in Paris, a stone canyon of Haussman-era buildings brightened by the occasional spray of geraniums on marble balconies. In the antechamber to his office a dozen chess sets from different countries were laid out on a low table—a reminder to the visitor that they are about to meet a man of the world and a master strategist. Vergès met me here, wearing a pale lavender dress shirt and silk vest and his familiar round-rimmed glasses. He shook my hand and guided me into his office. Wall-to-wall bookshelves extended to the high ceilings, thousands of books ranging from legal tomes, leather-bound volumes of theology and history to works of literature from Molière to F. Scott Fitzgerald. Around the office were mementos of Vergès’ past clients, such as the wooden mask given to him by Cheyenne Brando and a ten-foot tall statue of polished mahogany, a deity with the mouth of a crocodile and kangaroo ears, given to him by the Malian strongman General Moussa Traore.

Vergès spoke in elegant and clear French, interrupted by pauses to let a particularly apt phrase register or to punctuate a rhetorical question. He speaks warmly but with a steely conviction in his views. From time to time he laughed at some absurdity that he wanted to share with me, a strange chortle that began in his stomach and bubbled up through his chest to emerge just as he concluded his phrase.

His remarks that follow are not direct quotations. Vergès did not permit me to record our conversation and both my French and my shorthand are imperfect. Continue reading

Posted in Cambodia, International Law, Interview, Interviews | Tagged , , , | 1 Comment

World Wide Justice – Help Improve the ICC’s Website

Screen Shot 2013-08-23 at 12.16.20 PMAs readers know, both Kevin Jon Heller and I have recently been rather vocal about the ICC’s website (see here and here). In a nutshell, given the potential reach and impact of the Court’s site, it is currently a disaster. So it came as very welcome news that the Court has taken the long-standing criticisms about its website seriously. The ICC has set up a survey where observers and users of the site can provide their thoughts and feedback. The survey can be found here. I highly encourage all readers to take the time to fill out the survey. Kudos to the Court and, especially, to new Registrar Herman von Hebel, for taking on the initiative!

Posted in ICC Registry, International Criminal Court (ICC) | Tagged , | 1 Comment

Why Syria Still Won’t be Referred to the ICC

A Free Syrian Army Fighter (Photo: Goran Tomasevic/Reuters)

A Free Syrian Army Fighter (Photo: Goran Tomasevic/Reuters)

Forces loyal to Syrian President Bashar al-Assad probably used chemical weapons in an attack on the outskirts of Damascus. The United Nations responded that it will probably investigate what happened. Still, the International Criminal Court (ICC) probably won’t be investigating alleged crimes in Syria any time soon.

After two-and-a-half years of debilitating civil war in which some 80,000 – 100,000 people have been killed, the international community is no closer to bringing anyone suspected of war crimes and crimes against humanity in Syria to account. It isn’t because there’s a lack of injustices to investigate. The alleged chemical weapons attack on civilians is just the latest atrocity to garner the attention of advocates seeking referral of the situation in Syria to the ICC. But despite the outcry over the barbarity of this attack, it remains unlikely that that the ICC will find itself investigating atrocities in Syria. Here’s a few reasons why – some obvious, some perhaps less so.

The Continued Stalemate with Russia

The ongoing stalemate between Russia (and, to a lesser extent, China) and the rest of the Security Council is the most obvious and most widely reported reason as to why no ‘breakthrough’ on the Syria question has been achieved. In order for the ICC to intervene, the UN Security Council would have to refer Syria to the Court. In order to do so, Russia needs to either abstain or vote in favour of a referral. It isn’t likely to do so.

Russia, it is regularly argued, remains stubbornly supportive of the Assad regime. Russia has supplied Syria with “advanced missiles” and has consistently protected Assad from assertive action by the Security Council. In July, the Russian government suggested that it was the rebels who had used chemical weapons in their fight against the regime. In emergency meetings where the Council discussed how to respond to the alleged chemical weapons attack, Russia maintained that videos showing civilians suffering from the effects of chemical agents was a “premeditated provocation” and was likely fabricated by Syria’s rebel forces. This was in line with the response of the Syrian regime.

It is easy to believe that Russia will, come hell or high water, stand by Assad. Still, however deplorable Russia’s position on Syria has been, it has also proved a useful scapegoat to Western states eager talk the talk but unwilling to walk the walk.

A man mourns the death of his daughter in Aleppo (Photo: Javier Manzano / AFP / Getty Images)

A man mourns the death of his daughter in Aleppo (Photo: Javier Manzano / AFP / Getty Images)

Stalemate amongst Western States

It has regularly been argued that if only Russia would step aside, the rest of the international community could finally intervene in Syria. This unfortunate but popular characterization of the situation obfuscates the reality that the international community has long been intervening in Syria Indeed, the civil war in Syria is something of a proxy battle with Russia arming the government and the ‘West’ arming the rebels (consequently, the (re)solution of the Syrian civil war is likely to depend on the relationship between Russia and the ‘West’ as much as what happens on the ground). The debate over intervention in Syria is thus not one of action versus inaction. And when observers suggest that the international community should be “doing more” in Syria, they are calling for some form of direct military intervention. For the many who continue to be wary that a direct intervention in Syria could spell disaster – for Syria and for the wider region – anything and anyone that blocks such an intervention is welcome news.

As for a judicial intervention by the ICC, the story is similar. The UN Commission of Inquiry on Syria has catalogued rebel crimes and, according to UN High Commissioner for Human Rights Navi Pillay, the Syrian rebels that the ‘West’ supports have likely committed war crimes. This certainly complicates any idea of Western states using the ICC as a tool to hurt the regime. In the initial stages of the civil war, it was foreseeable that the P3 could ‘use’ the ICC as they had in Libya – to pressure the Assad regime, bolster efforts to depose him, and legitimate the opposition. Now, however, the ICC would almost certainly investigate – and indict – both sides. But Western powers likely prefer no judicial intervention than one that targets the side they support.  Continue reading

Posted in International Criminal Court (ICC), Russia, Syria, UN Security Council, United Nations | Tagged , | 7 Comments

Could Russia be a Key to International Justice in Libya?

(Photo: Andrew Winning / Reuters)

(Photo: Andrew Winning / Reuters)

The battle between Libya and the International Criminal Court (ICC) over where Abdullah al-Senussi and Saif al-Islam Gaddafi should be tried has taken another dramatic turn.

Saif’s legal representative John Jones has written a scathing letter to the UK’s Foreign Secretary William Hague in which he decried what he views as Britain’s hypocrisy in selectively promoting international justice:

“You cannot plausibly claim to be a champion of international humanitarian law while turning a blind eye to Libya’s faults… Libya is defying the ICC’s order to hand over Saif. The foreign secretary needs to demonstrate Britain’s backing for the court.”

At the same time, Ben Emmerson and the team of lawyers representing Abdullah al-Senussi have requested that ICC judges refer Libya to the Security Council over fears that a planned trial of Senussi in Libya “will be nothing more than sham justice, the old-fashioned show trial”.

As I have previously argued, the Security Council has completely shirked its responsibility in assuring that justice is achieved in Libya. When the Revolution began in February 2011, the P3 (the US, France and the UK) calculated that it would be useful to get the ICC involved. The Court’s intervention helped to further isolate and delegitimize Gaddafi, stigmatized him with the label “international criminal” and, in so doing, laid the grounds for a military intervention that could framed as being primarily about serving justice and removing an illegitimate, criminal leader. Seeing an opportunity to capture international attention, the ICC went along with the show. Controversially, the Security Council gave the cash-strapped Court no funding, prevented it from investigating any alleged crimes before 15 February 2011, and ensured that no citizens of states that weren’t members of the ICC could be prosecuted. At the time, the Court and its most fervent supporters didn’t seem to mind. If they did, they certainly didn’t make a fuss.

The Security Council’s interest in Libya quickly waned. Before the civil war was over, its members began softening their positions on enforcing international justice in Libya. The new government – whoever it was – would be able to decide what happened with Libya’s ICC indictees. The Court was hung out to dry.

It is this dynamic which, in my view, at least partially helps to explain why the Office of the Prosecutor, first under Luis Moreno-Ocampo and now under Fatou Bensouda, was inclined to side with Libya in its quest to prosecute Saif and Senussi in Libya, by Libyans. There wasn’t exactly a long line of powerful actors demanding that Saif and Senussi be transferred to The Hague. With no influential powers in its corner, repeatedly declaring that Libya should hand over suspects would not only be futile but make the Court look impotent.

(Photo: Democratic Underground)

(Photo: Democratic Underground)

With time, some observers began to openly question the Security Council’s role in promoting the ICC and international justice more broadly. Some even suggested that, if the Council were to refer another case to the Court, the ICC might consider politely declining. Still, by and large, the P3 Security Council members haven’t had to defend themselves. As the legal battle between Libya and the ICC has dragged on, there’s been virtually no pressure on them to intervene with either words or deeds. When pressed, their response has generally been to request that the Court and Libya “cooperate”. But if Saif and Senussi’s defence teams are successful in getting their clients’ predicaments on the agenda of the Council, the P3 might just be forced to justify their positions and perhaps even take some action. Here, Russia could play a very important role.

Russia is undoubtedly upset over how the Libyan conflict transpired. Contrary to the narrative that the media has propagated, however, Russia isn’t upset with the fact that NATO’s intervention digressed into regime change. It is impossible that, when Russia supported the referral of Libya to the ICC and allowed NATO to intervene, it didn’t know what it was getting in to. Rather, it appears that the Russian government is upset that it hasn’t been able to cash in on the spoils of war. Libya and Russia had lucrative deals (including for oil) in place prior to the Revolution. Since the intervention, Russia’s economic interests in the country have been ignored.

Russia is keen to take the P3 to task over Libya and in doing so it has defended the mandate of the ICC. And why not? They are in full knowledge that the P3 has ignored the Court and its work in Libya.  Continue reading

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Impending Disaster? The ICC in Kenya and Africa

Kenyan President Uhuru Kenyatta (Photo: TV/C)

Kenyan President Uhuru Kenyatta (Photo: TV/C)

Dear readers,

I recently had the pleasure and honour to write a brief article for the UNA-UK’s publication New World on what the election of Kenyatta and Ruto in Kenya means for the ICC. For anyone interested, the full article can be found here. Here’s a glimpse:

There is no denying that the recent election of Uhuru Kenyatta and William Ruto as President and Vice President of Kenya respectively, came as a significant blow to the International Criminal Court (ICC). The ICC had identified Kenyatta and Ruto as bearing responsibility for crimes committed during the 2007/2008 post-election violence in Kenya. Their election has left the belief that the ICC could isolate and marginalise its targets battered. Some have even suggested that the ICC indictments could have helped Kenyatta and Uhuru achieve electoral victory, in a country where it’s reported that just 35% of the population now support the Court.

The situation has elevated criticisms of the ICC as a ‘neo-colonialist’ institution biased against African states to a new level and put the relationship between Africa and the ICC under the microscope once again. Ugandan President Yoweri Museveni praised Kenyans for rejecting “blackmail by the International Criminal Court and those who seek to abuse this institution for their own agenda”. And Ethiopian Prime Minister Hailemariam Desalegn proclaimed that the Court was “race hunting”. The African Union subsequently passed a resolution insisting that the Court was unfairly targeting African states. Had it not been for the lone dissenting voice of Botswana, the resolution would have passed unanimously.

There have also been numerous calls to dismiss the cases against Ruto and Kenyatta. The trials for both have been repeatedly delayed. Dozens of witnesses have withdrawn their testimonies amidst reports of witness tampering and, in some cases, disappearances. Despite stating that there would be “consequences” if Kenyatta was elected, many ICC member-states have since congratulated Kenyatta on his victory. Given this laundry list of controversies, it is hard not to wonder whether Kenya is the hill the Court’s relationship with Africa will die on.

So what is the Court to do?

Read more.

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