Syria: Appeasement in Disguise?

Andrew Jillions joins JiC for another thought-provoking guest post on responses to the ongoing humanitarian crisis in Syria. Enjoy!

Kofi Annan was in New York yesterday to brief the Security Council on the mess that is Syria. But whatever (limited) hopes there might be of his ability to negotiate an end to the violence, the humanitarian mission also disguises a depressing reality: short of appeasement, the international community has no good strategy for responding to a well-protected regime intent on committing criminal acts.

Debates on what to do about Syria have – on the surface at least – moved on apace since the China/Russia veto last month (which was, in any case, over-hyped). Everyone seems to agree that Bashar al-Assad needs to stop killing and torturing civilians. As Ban Ki Moon put it on the anniversary of the uprising, “the status quo in Syria is indefensible”. In the rarefied domain of international politics, the widespread acceptance of this point counts as a victory. But beyond this limited solidarity, there is scant agreement over what practical steps to take.

The key obstacle to intervention is the fact that al-Assad’s regime is protected, in large part, by the presence of an unconvincing opposition. Even if a unified opposition could be mustered up, potentially through foreign support, the worry remains that this would splinter as soon as their one point of agreement – regime change – was achieved. Getting rid of al-Assad with no viable alternative in place will usher in an era of violent disorder and instability.

Russia and Syria

(Cartoon: Kalasnikov)

It is possible, as Steven Cook argues, that this chaotic outcome isn’t quite as certain as the anti-interventionists suggest. As I’ve previously argued, there is something devious about discounting intervention on the basis of an imagined and uncertain level of future chaos and bloodshed – using the “unknown unknowns” as good reasons not to act. In the meantime, real people are dying in real time. The footage is there for all to see.

This is all beside the point in the current diplomatic climate. The inscrutable message is that al-Assad must go – as Obama put it, “it’s not a question of if, but when” – but also that military intervention is not a viable option, fomenting a Syrian civil war is not a desirable option. The hope seems to be that al-Assad can be put under enough pressure by rebel forces, by his own government ministers, and by the international community that he can be convinced to willingly step down. Continue reading

Posted in Humanitarian Intervention, Justice, Responsibiltiy to Protect (R2P), Syria, Turkey, UN Security Council, Uncategorized | 3 Comments

Kony 2012 – How 100 Million Clicks Went to Waste

Photo by Invisible Children

The Kony 2012 video produced by Invisible Children has attracted somewhere between 80 and 100 million views by now. No matter what your position on the campaign is, it is undeniable that it managed to tap a huge reservoir of public attention. The viral campaign and reactions to the video quickly spilled over from internet blogs to the classic medias, with basically all big newspapers, TV stations and radio stations running a story on Kony 2012 at least once. And that’s when it all went wrong.

The simplified and – as many rightly point out – to some extent even dangerous message of the video was answered with a global smear campaign that started picking apart not only Kony 2012 but also Invisible Children’s organizational structures and accounting practices. In the end, Kony 2012 has left behind only losers. The current victims of the LRA in the Democratic Republic of Congo, the Central African Republic and South Sudan remain largely ignored, the formerly war affected communities in northern Uganda feel deeply offended by the video, the work of Invisible Children has been discredited, its co-founder and Kony 2012 producer Jason Russel had a mental breakdown in public, and a huge potential of public awareness that could have really made a difference in Central Africa has been squandered.

At the end of the day, the Kony 2012 saga is a very sad story that shows how shallow discussions about complex issues in our mass media still are. Yes, the message of Kony 2012 was oversimplified, yes it painted a wrong picture of what was happening in the LRA conflict, and yes it also offered the wrong answers and sent a dangerous message of militarisation. I adhere to my criticism of the Kony 2012 campaign, and there have been others like Alex de Waal and Mahmood Mamdani who have been much more eloquent and precise in pointing out the real weaknesses in the campaign.

If even a couple of thousand people watched the video and then read the highly informed responses of de Waal, Mamdani and the likes, a lot has been done in terms of awareness rising for the complex issues surrounding the LRA conflict. I also maintain that Invisible Children has not been able to convincingly answer the main points of criticism, especially the warnings that another military intervention along the lines advocated by IC against the LRA is prone to lead to only more civilian casualties. But unfortunately this was not the main thrust of criticism brought forward by the big media outlets. As Adam Finck who currently works with Invisible Children in DRC rightly points out when rebutting some of the less well-founded criticism surrounding Kony 2012, the critics of IC also made an error by oversimplifying the work of Invisible Children.

One of the internet reactions to Kony 2012

As I previously wrote, the work of Invisible Children in the currently war affected areas (mainly DRC and CAR) is of a vital importance. It is one of the few organisations that had the courage of moving into these areas and opening a reception centre for returning LRA abductees/fighters in DRC where it most mattered. It has also helped to build up a high frequency radio early warning system in the area to help civilians to react to LRA attacks in time. The media smear campaign ensuing from the Kony 2012 criticism might have devastating long-term consequences for the work of IC in these areas. Continue reading

Posted in Advocacy, Democratic Republic of Congo, Lord's Resistance Army (LRA), Southern Sudan, Uganda | Tagged , , , , , , , , , , , , , | 23 Comments

Beyond ‘KONY2012’ – Judgement Day and the Lubanga Verdict

Thomas Lubanga verdict

(Photo: AFP)

The ICC’s first-ever verdict is in. Any way you cut it, the guilty verdict issued today against Thomas Lubanga for his use of child soldiers is a landmark ruling. But will it have any effect on the conscription of child soldiers in the future?

The trial, verdict and sentence will undoubtedly (and hopefully) have a deep effect on the practice of the ICC. That being said, many of problems that marred the trial cannot be ascribed to the Court’s “growing pains”. At times the prosecution played a game of fast-and-loose with the law to such an extent that it threatened the possibility of ever getting to today’s verdict.

As many commentators have pointed out, the trial has been riddled with problems from the very get-go. The Office of the Prosecutor has been criticized by a myriad of human rights groups for its myopic approach to the case, focusing only on Lubanga’s use of child soldiers. While the belief is that the narrow focus was chosen to ensure that the trial moved along efficiently, the prosecution hasn’t been particularly forthcoming with its reasoning. As Kevin Jon Heller notes, “for reasons that still have never been adequately explained…[the prosecution] declined to bring more serious charges against [Lubanga], even though he had been facing murder and torture charges in the DRC.” Neither is a five-year trial anyone’s gold standard for efficiency.

The prosecution’s use of ‘intermediaries’ (see also here) to gather evidence on the ground was also widely and vehemently criticized. The ruling judges, in law-speak, agreed that the prosecution had handled ‘intermediaries’ disastrously. Twice (twice!), judges ruled that the prosecution’s behaviour amounted to a denial of a fair trial, suspended proceedings and ordered Lubanga to be released (on both occasions the rulings were reversed on appeal from the prosecution).

Child soldiers in Eastern DRC (Photo: Nicolas Postal/EPA/Corbis)

The trial of Lubanga has been so rife with controversy and problems that it was not clear that a unanimously guilty verdict would be handed down. Many believe that one judge in particular, Adrian Fulford, would issue a dissenting ruling. Richard Walker writes that “A collective sigh of relief was breathed by the ICC Chief Prosecutor Luis Moreno-Ocampo and his successor Fatou Bensouda who sat side by side listening anxiously to Presiding Judge Adrian Fulford” deliver the Chamber’s ruling.

Before anyone pops open a champagne bottle, it is important to remember that it is far too early to call the Lubanga verdict a victory for justice and for the victims and survivors of the conflict. The trial-chamber has not yet issued a sentence and it is anyone’s guess what punishment will be meted out. Importantly, the sentence will have palpable effects on the ground, where fear and anticipation is high while opinions are sharply divided.

Notably, Lubanga has been in detention for seven years. Thus, if he receives a sentence of ten years, he will be a free man in three. Most educated guesses peg the sentencing at 10-15 years. Undoubtedly, the decision by Prosecutor Luis Moreno-Ocampo to restrict the charges to those pertaining to the use of child soldiers will come under heavy fire if the sentence is relatively lenient. Criticism will only intensify if the prosecution’s controversial use of intermediaries is taken into account and it wouldn’t be surprising if it did. Continue reading

Posted in Child Soldiers, Democratic Republic of Congo, Deterrence, ICC Prosecutor, International Criminal Court (ICC), Lord's Resistance Army (LRA) | 5 Comments

What Went Wrong During the Lubanga Trial

A child soldier rides back to his base in Ituri Province (Marcus Bleasdale/VII)

The International Criminal Court has delivered its first verdict, finding the Congolese warlord Thomas Lubanga guilty on charges of conscripting and enlisting children, and using them to participate in hostilities during the Ituri conflict between 2002 and 2003.

Today’s ruling marks the end of the ICC’s first trial, a trial that has been going on since 2006 and which has been marred with fair trial issues raised by the defence. In fact, the trial chamber ordered Lubanga to be set free twice because the Office of the Prosecutor (OTP) failed to disclose information to the defence and because of general fair trial issues. Only appeals by the OTP that were granted by the Appeals Chamber ensured that the trial went on. At the time of writing the sentence is not yet clear, but we may well see Thomas Lubanga walk free as a result of these delays as he has already served nearly ten years of his sentence if his time in Congolese prisons is taken into consideration. Additionally, the defence still has a right to appeal the sentence.

Regardless, bringing its first trial to an end is a milestone for the ICC and for Chief Prosecutor Luis Moreno-Ocampo who has thus managed to ensure at least one verdict in his 9 year tenure. Nevertheless, the first trial completed at the ICC leaves a bad taste in one’s mouth.

Some of the issues that arose during the first trial are perfectly understandable for a newly established court, especially if one takes into consideration that it operates under quite a unique mixture of Civil Law and Common Law. Lubanga’s trial was nearly stopped twice due to issues of sharing evidence and allegations that Lubanga was not receiving a fair trial connected to these issues. The OTP used so-called intermediaries in the field to collect information and evidence from eyewitnesses in the conflict region. The defence accused one of the intermediaries of having bribed witnesses into delivering false accusations against Lubanga and thus demanded a disclosure of the name of said intermediary. The court ordered the name to be disclosed, but the Chief Prosecutor refused to do so, claiming that he could not guarantee the security of the intermediary if he was not given more time to put protective measures in place.

Lubanga during an ICC hearing (Photo: Ed Oudenaarden/AFP/Getty)

The use of intermediaries is an understandable choice for an office that conducts investigations in conflict areas in which movement is limited and international prosecutors from The Hague are bound to provoke a lot of attention. One of the legacies of the Lubanga trial is the decision of the chamber on the use of intermediaries. Even though the question of intermediaries led to a very long trial and may have violated Lubanga’s right to an expeditious trial, clarifying these issues were necessary steps in the ICC’s development. The chamber’s ruling has been clear in stating that the Prosecutor should not have delegated his responsibility for investigating and that he is to be faulted for some evidence becoming unreliable as a result. This is a welcome development as it will ensure that OTP staff will stay in touch with the region in which they are investigating crimes. The ICC is already accused of being too removed from the realities on the ground and this tendency would be worsened if investigators never saw the field.

But other issues during the Lubanga trial are actually more worrying. Continue reading

Posted in Complementarity, Democratic Republic of Congo, International Criminal Court (ICC), War crimes | 1 Comment

Taking ‘Kony2012’ Down a Notch – Responding to Criticism

LRA combatants

LRA combatants (Photo: AP/File)

Over the past few days, many readers have commented on the blog, Twitter, Facebook and I want to thank you all for that. Thanks to everyone who took the time to read our perspective. We have contributed to an incredibly important debate and have begun the process of refuting the idea that awareness must come at the expense of understanding.

It is in contributing to understanding the issues, and not site hits or blog stats, that I feel that both Patrick’s and my post have been a success. I was also very happy that Invisible Children themselves have responded to the critiques that were levied, although I will leave it to readers to judge whether their responses are adequate.

My position remains the same. I remain opposed to the Kony2012 video and campaign and not because I don’t believe that increasing awareness is wrong. Many have commented to the effect that “you have a point, but knowing about this is success in its own right.” But awareness for awareness’ sake is not only futile but potentially dangerous (see here, here and here). The diagnosis of the ‘LRA question’ that the Kony2012 clip makes is so far from any truth or reality that the prescription it offers – or instills in the minds of those who watch the film with an uncritical eye – may end up doing a disservice to victims and survivors.

Others have suggested that the conclusion I reach is that unless the campaign “has it perfect”, we should do nothing. In other words, I’m unfairly raining on the Kony2012 parade. This could not be further from the truth. I accept that viral campaigns can be useful and that they inevitably must simplify issues as complex as the conflicts in northern Uganda and LRA-affected areas. The question is: at what point does simplifying an issue pass a threshold where it no longer even approximates reality and becomes detrimental to a cause? I continue to believe the film, Kony2012 (again, not Invisible Children as a whole) has passed this threshold – by miles. Continue reading

Posted in Advocacy, Justice, Lord's Resistance Army (LRA), Peace Negotiations, Peace Processes, Uganda | 22 Comments

Kony 2012: The Invisible Children Advocacy Campaign to Catch Kony

The montage used as one of the lead themes for the Kony 2012 campagin, showing Kony with his 'thousands of captured children'. Research says that most of the LRA soldiers are adolescents or young adults. (Photo: Invisible Children)

Yesterday evening, a Youtube video by Invisible Children on Joseph Kony, the Chairman of the Lord’s Resistance Army, started popping up in my Facebook newsfeed. I didn’t think much of it as my newsfeed is usually pretty full with articles and reports from Uganda, as I follow many different organisations working on the LRA. Since I am going through all LRA related news on a daily basis anyway, I watched it during my evening workout, and it left me impressed. It is a superb example of an advocacy video that is very touching while giving you the feeling that you can make a change.

The video describes, in sketchy details, how the Lord’s Resistance Army has been abducting children for the past 26 years in order to fill its ranks and to wage an apparently causeless conflict in which it mutilates civilians (not my opinion but the way the conflict is presented). The narrative is as simple as it is powerful: Kony is the bad guy who has abducted thousands of children and needs to be stopped. Jason Russel, one of the founders of Invisible Children Inc., his little son, and all of us are the good guys whose mission should be to stop Kony. The means: mobilise as many people as possible to lobby influential artists and politicians to stand up for the cause to ‘remove Joseph Kony from the battlefield’. This in turn will make sure that there is enough awareness and civil society pressure surrounding the LRA conflict that the 100 combat equipped US troops deployed by the Obama administration in autumn 2011 stay until their job to help catching Kony is finished.

The hits our blog received so far today demonstrated to me how effective the message has been: we had nearly 9 times the traffic we would have on a normal day around noon. Most people found the site searching for ‘Kony’ or ‘Joseph Kony’, our articles on Uganda being by far the most read ones. It is both assuring and scary how many people can be mobilised within 24 hours by publishing a well-made advocacy/documentary clip.

Don’t get me wrong, I do think a lot of good things can come out of this. It is true that the security interests of the US in engaging the LRA are minimal. It is also true that the troops will be withdrawn from Central Africa if they are not successful relatively soon, and that the public pressure to keep them there is not strong enough.

It is also true that Invisible Children has done some good work in northern Uganda and the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). The most recent and maybe most relevant example is that Invisible Children has opened up a reception centre for abducted children and adolescents who escape the LRA in the DRC. It is the only reception centre in the DRC so far, and its opening can be expected to have a real impact since people who fled from the LRA have really nowhere else to turn since the rebel group left northern Uganda with its reception centres. Advocating to keep US troops in Uganda and donating some money to Invisible Children’s ‘TRI’ programme is thus not a bad idea.

One of the child soldiers forcibly recruited into the LRA. They are the main victims in Invisible Children's narrative, waiting to be rescued (The Children of the Nile)

Yet, there are several caveats and points of criticism that arise when having a closer look at the advocacy campaign and the local context in Uganda, DRC, the Central African Republic and Southern Sudan. Let me first just briefly point out the typical ‘tricks’ used in advocacy videos to generate a maximum of indignation and mobilise as many people as possible. The video shows posters apparently printed for the Kony 2012 campaign that display Kony together with Adolf Hitler and Osama bin Laden. It is ridiculous to compare Joseph Kony with the worst mass murderer in history (only Josef Stalin could come close to challenging Hitler for that title) and America’s now defunct public enemy number one. Kony’s relevance is completely blown out of proportion by these comparisons and they only serve to brand him as the pure evil. Continue reading

Posted in Advocacy, Central African Republic (CAR), Democratic Republic of Congo, Lord's Resistance Army (LRA), Osama bin Laden, Uganda | Tagged , , , , , , , , , , , | 119 Comments

Taking ‘Kony 2012’ Down A Notch

The makers of Kony 2012

The makers of Kony 2012. (Photo: Glenna Gordon / Scarlett Lion)

As we speak, one of the most pervasive and successful human rights based viral campaigns in recent memory is underway. Invisible Children’s ‘Kony 2012‘ campaign has taken Twitter, Youtube, Facebook and every other mainstream social media refuge by storm. In many ways, it is quite impressive. But there’s one glaring problem: the campaign reflects neither the realities of northern Ugandan nor the attitudes of its people. In this context, this post examines the explicit and implicit claims made by the ‘Kony 2012’ campaign and tests them against the empirical record on the ground.

Before jumping into the fray, however, I should preface the post by noting that, in many ways, Invisible Children have done a fantastic job in advocating for the rights of northern Ugandans, highlighting the conflict and providing tangible benefits to victims and survivors of LRA brutality. Indeed, this post is not intended to take aim at Invisible Children as an organization but rather to debunk some of the myths its ‘Kony 2012’ campaign is propagating.

The Problem is Popularity? 

Kony 2012 is about making Joseph Kony, the leader of the notorious LRA, famous because, the line of reasoning goes, if everyone knew him, no one would be able to stand idly by as he waged his brutal campaign of terror against the people of East Africa.

I am actually stupefied that any analysis of the ‘LRA question’ results in the identification of the problem being that “Kony isn’t popular enough”. The reality is that few don’t know who Joseph Kony is in East Africa and the Great Lakes Region, making it all-too-apparent that this isn’t about them, their views or their experiences. But even more puzzling is that Joseph Kony is one of the best known alleged war criminals in the world – including in the United States. This is the case in large part because of the advocacy of Western NGOs, including Invisible Children and the Enough Project as well as the ICC arrest warrants issued against Kony and his senior command.

I would understand if this were the 1990s or even the early 2000s when the misery plaguing northern Uganda flew completely under the radar. I would understand if this campaign was about the ongoing conflict in the Democratic Republic of Congo. But a campaign in 2012, premised on Joseph Kony not being famous enough is just folly.

'Kony 2012'

A poster from the 'Kony 2012' campaign. (Poster: Invisible Children)

Umm…what about northern Ugandans?

It is hard to respect any documentary on northern Uganda where a five year-old white boy features more prominently than any northern Ugandan victim or survivor. Incredibly, with the exception of the adolescent northern Ugandan victim, Jacob, the voices of northern Ugandans go almost completely unheard.

It isn’t hard to imagine why the views of northern Ugandans wouldn’t be considered: they don’t fit with the narrative produced and reproduced in the insulated echo chamber that produced the ‘Kony 2012’ film.

‘Kony 2012’, quite dubiously, avoids stepping into the ‘peace-justice’ question in northern Uganda precisely because it is a world of contesting and plural views, eloquently expressed by the northern Ugandans themselves. Some reports suggest that the majority of Acholi people continue to support the amnesty process whereby LRA combatants – including senior officials – return to the country in exchange for amnesty and entering a process of ‘traditional justice’. Many continue to support the Ugandan Amnesty law because of the reality that it is their own children who constitute the LRA. Once again, this issue is barely touched upon in the film. Yet the LRA poses a stark dilemma to the people of northern Uganda: it is now composed primarily of child soldiers, most of whom were abducted and forced to join the rebel ranks and commit atrocities. Labeling them “victims” or “perpetrators” becomes particularly problematic as they are often both.

Furthermore, the crisis in northern Uganda is not seen by its citizens as one that is the result of the LRA. Yes, you read that right. The conflict in the region is viewed as one wherein both the Government of Uganda and the LRA, as well as their regional supporters (primarily South Sudan and Khartoum, respectively) have perpetrated and benefited from nearly twenty-five years of systemic and structural violence and displacement. This pattern is what Chris Dolan has eloquently and persuasively termed ‘social torture‘ wherein both the Ugandan Government and the LRA’s treatment of the population has resulted in symptoms of collective torture and the blurring of the perpetrator-victim binary.

Kony and Egeland

Kony and his former second in command, Vincent Otti, with former UN Undersecretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs and Emergency Relief Coordinator, Jan Egeland (Photo: New York Times)

The Solution?

Given Invisible Children’s problematic identification of the issue, it becomes impossible for them to come up with an appropriate vision of resolving the crisis.

Invisible Children is, perhaps rightly, proud that it put the ‘LRA question’ on the Obama administration’s agenda. In this context, last year’s announcement that the administration would send 100 military ‘advisors’ to Uganda was widely celebrated. But this triumphalism occludes key realities.

The sending of 100 troops was not, in any sense, an altruistic move by the administration. First, it went unreported that many of the troops were already in Uganda. Second, the announcement was, at least in part, a tit-for-tat response for the Government of Uganda’s military engagement in Somalia – where the US refuses to deploy troops. As Matt Brown of the Enough Project conceded:

“The U.S. doesn’t have to fight al-Qaida-linked Shabab in Somalia, so we help Uganda take care of their domestic security problems, freeing them up to fight a more dangerous – or a more pressing, perhaps – issue in Somalia.

It is clear that the ‘Kony 2012’ campaign sees the 100 US troop allotment as inadequate. Here they are right – 100 US troops is not the solution. But their own answer is highly problematic.

We know what the makers of “Kony 2012” believe should happen but they won’t say it explicitly, except to say that Kony must be “stopped”.

Obama’s orders for his 100 troops – presumably supported by those behind ‘Kony 2012’ – is to “kill or capture” Joseph Kony. I don’t think it is a stretch to suggest that many of the same individuals who will form the legion of participants in ‘Kony 2012’ were on the streets celebrating the killing of Osama bin Laden. It thus likely holds that they bought into the belief, proffered by Obama himself, that bin Laden’s killing amounted to justice and if you didn’t agree, you should get your head checked.

The solution then, is something similar: an American-led intervention into at least four countries where the LRA is or has been active (Uganda, the DRC, the Central African Republic and South Sudan) to hunt down Kony. Capturing him, after all, is secondary to “stopping” him.

The idea of “stopping Kony”, of course plays into the narrative created by the ‘Kony 2012’ campaign where what actually happens to Kony and the LRA is irrelevant. The unspecific aim of “stopping” him is sufficient. Who, after all, doesn’t want Kony “stopped”? But then what? If Kony is killed or captured, then what? What happens to the other members of the LRA? ‘Kony 2012’ offers no answers here.

In this context, it is worthwhile remembering that massive regional military solutions (Operations Iron Fist and Lightning Thunder most recently), with support from the US, have thus far failed to dismantle or “stop” the LRA. These failures have created serious and legitimate doubts that the ‘LRA question’ is one that can be resolved by military means.

Incredibly, there is no mention in the film or the campaign that northern Ugandans are currently enjoying the longest period of peace since the conflict began in 1986. Virtually every single northern Ugandan I spoke to during my own field research believes that there is peace in the region. While sporadic violence continues, particularly as a result of bitter land disputes, there have been no LRA attacks in years. In the mid 2000s, the ‘LRA problem’ was exported out of Uganda. The LRA is currently residing in the DRC, CAR, and perhaps parts of South Sudan and even Darfur. Today, land issues and the recent Walk to Work crisis are higher on the agenda than the LRA in northern Uganda.

Lastly, killing Kony cannot resolve the actual sources of the crisis which are far more structural than superficial (to put it lightly) analyses like ‘Kony 2012’ would like to admit. As respected scholars of northern Uganda, Mareike Schomerus, Tim Allen, and Koen Vlassenroot, recently argued,

“Until the underlying problem — the region’s poor governance — is adequately dealt with, there will be no sustainable peace.”

Kony (left) with Otti. (Photo: AFP)

The Need for a Sober Second Thought

In the end, ‘Kony 2012’ falls prey to the obfuscating, simplified and wildly erroneous narrative of a legitimate, terror-fighting, innocent partner of the West (the Government of Uganda) seeking to eliminate a band of lunatic, child-thieving, machine-gun wielding mystics (the LRA). The main beneficiary of this narrative is, once again, the Ugandan Government of Yoweri Museveni, whose legitimacy is bolstered and – if the ‘Kony 2012’ campaign is ‘successful’ – will receive more military funding and support from the US.

Of course, as a viral campaign launched through social media, ‘Kony 2012’ is impressive, if not unprecedented. It will, undoubtedly, mobilize and morph a horde of sincere American youths into proxy war criminal hunters. It will further succeed in increasing the ‘popularity’ of Joseph Kony and the LRA in the United States. But it will do so for many of – if not all – the wrong reasons.

I remember when I was in grade school and a teacher told the students that it was actually difficult to fail. “You have to try to fail,” he said. If ‘Kony 2012’ is to be judged by its reflection of the realities on the ground in northern Uganda and how it measures up against the empirical record, the makers of Kony 2012 tried – and succeeded.

——————————

UPDATE: I’ve now published a response to the main criticisms that this post has inspired. See here: Taking ‘Kony2012′ Down a Notch – Responding to Criticism.

Check out this excellent account by Daniel Solomon over at his blog, Securing Rights.

Also, big thanks to my friend and colleague, Paul Kirby, for his insightful comments on a draft of this post.

Posted in Lord's Resistance Army (LRA), Uganda | 909 Comments

Whither ICC Deterrence in Libya?

Abu Salim Prison in Libya (Photo: Sergey Ponomarev/AP)

In recent years, advocates of the International Criminal Court have shifted away from justifying international justice through purely moral claims towards arguing for trial justice on the basis of the consequences it can bring about. Leslie Vinjamuri has persuasively demonstrated this consequentialist turn in a recent article. Amongst the oft-proferred arguments put forward is that the pursuit of international criminal justice can deter crimes from occurring.

Broadly speaking, deterrence can occur at two levels. First, and most broadly, international criminal justice is seen by its champions to deter crimes on an international or global level. Anyone thinking of committing crimes against humanity, genocide or war crimes now or in the future will be deterred from doing so because of the mere existence of the ICC which will prosecute and punish those very acts.

Second, deterrence may be more targeted and localized. In this instance, intervention by the ICC in ongoing conflicts is said to deter those actively committing atrocities from continuing to do so. This post is concerned with this second type of ‘targeted deterrence’ in the context of Libya.

Getting Involved at ‘Break-Neck’ Speed

The ICC has never moved more quickly in its work than in the case of Libya. In comparison to other situations under investigation, the speed with which the Office of the Prosecutor (OTP) accepted the UN Security Council’s referral, opened an investigation and requested the issuance of arrest warrants against Colonel Muammar Gaddafi, his son Saif al-Islam Gaddafi and the regime’s head of intelligence, Abdullah al-Senussi, was unprecedented.

I have previously speculated why the ICC chose to move so quickly in the case of Libya. After speaking to some individuals familiar with the Court’s decision-making, however, I am increasingly convinced that the ICC moved so quickly primarily because it wanted to establish itself as ‘a player’ in Libya. In other words, the OTP saw an opportunity to prove its effectiveness and jumped at it, full-throttle. The deterrence factor was part of the calculus: if the ICC intervened in Libya and contributed to the termination of the conflict, the Court could claim it had deterred atrocities and helped establish peace.

Now, it may be that the ICC did help prevent the perpetration of some atrocities in Libya, especially if the defections of senior Gaddafi-regime figures can be linked to fears of being prosecuted by the Court, defections which can, in turn, be linked to the duration of the conflict. As importantly, there is no evidence that the Court contributed to an increase in atrocities by pro-Gaddafi forces or the prolongation of the conflict. But what about the Court’s deterrence effect on the rebels and what about deterrence in post-Gaddafi Libya?

Continue reading

Posted in Deterrence, International Criminal Court (ICC), Libya, Libya and the ICC, NATO | 2 Comments

An Interview with the ICC’s Judge Howard Morrison

Peter Quayle joins JiC for this fascinating glimpse into the views of newly elected ICC Judge, Howard Morrison. In this extract of Peter’s interview, Morrison discusses his career at the ICTY and ICTR, the Karadzic trial (where Morrison is a presiding judge) and the question of ICC bias towards African states. Enjoy!

ICC Judge

Judge Howard Morrison QC, a British barrister, was elected a judge of the International Criminal Court during the Tenth Assembly of State Parties, held in New York, December 2011. Judge Morrison has sat as a judge of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia since August 2009. He currently sits in the trial court trying Radovan Karadzic. But, as his questionnaire for the Coalition for the International Criminal Court amply demonstrates, this is only the most recent professional experience and latest judicial office that recommended him to the ICC.

As an advocate, called to the Bar in 1977, his early regional criminal practice included considerable advocacy before Courts Martial. He became a QC in 2001, reflective of his achievements as an advocate, including prosecuting the most serious cases for the Crown Prosecution Service, including sexual violence crimes. From 1998 until 2004, he was also a defence counsel in numerous trials before the ICTY and the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, including the Celebici prison-camp and Nikolic cases. As a judge, Morrison was Resident Chief Magistrate of Fiji and Senior Magistrate of Tuvala, 1986 to 1988. In the courts of England and Wales, he was appointed a Circuit Judge in 2004. In 2008 he was appointed a Senior Judge of the Sovereign Base Areas of Cyprus.

The sixth elections to the ICC, replacing six vacating judges, changed a third of the court’s bench. Each judge is elected for a non-renewable nine year term. Judge Morrison will be sworn in on March 11, 2012 but first complete his cases at the ICTY before assuming his duties at the ICC. Once he does, it is likely that his extraordinary expertise will make him amongst the court’s most authoritative and influential judges.

Peter Quayle (PQ): Were you always interested in an international criminal law career? What has influenced you step by step in your career?

Judge Morrison (JM): When at the Bar I did as much overseas Courts Martial work as I could muster. The idea of international law always fascinated me and I read as much about the Nuremburg and Tokyo trials as possible. After nine years practice as a junior barrister I was able to secure a post as a Resident and then Chief Magistrate in Fiji combined with the post of Senior Magistrate in Tuvalu, followed by a stint in the Caribbean after military coups in Fiji disrupted the judiciary.

Radovan Karadzic

PQ: After your overseas judicial appointments, what led to your being retained as defence counsel at the ICTY/ICTR?

JM: Following those duties there was a decade of prosecuting and defending on the Midland and Oxford Circuit which was interrupted in 1998 when I answered an ad in Counsel [the monthly journal of the Bar in England and Wales] asking for expressions of interest from those who might like to defend at the ICTY in The Hague. A month or so later, a phone call in hesitant German one evening from a Bosnian Croat who wanted me to help conduct his appeal in the Celebici case [the first command/superior responsibility appeal since Nuremburg] gave me the first of three substantial cases at the ICTY and led in turn to a defence case of a Rwandan Cabinet Minister charged with genocide at the ICTR in Arusha, Tanzania.

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Posted in ICTY, International Criminal Court (ICC), International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR), Interview, Justice | Leave a comment

The Habré Case at the International Court of Justice – Belgium versus Senegal

Former Chadian President Habré leaving the Court of Appeal in Dakar after attending a hearing in 2005 (Recup Seyllou, AFP)

A couple of months back I wrote a post on the efforts of international and Chadian human rights advocates to prosecute the former President of Chad, Hissene Habré. Habré is accused of killing and torturing thousands during his stay in power between 1982 and 1990. Two of the main actors who have been fighting for a prosecution of Habré for nearly two decades are the Chadian lawyer Jacqueline Moudeina who received the Alternative Peace Nobel Prize in 2011 for her persistent work to end impunity for Habrés crimes, and Reed Brody from Human Rights Watch.

An interesting twist to the case came up when victims supported by Moudeina and Brody decided to file a case against Habré in Belgium on the principle of universal jurisdiction. Attempts to prosecute Habré in his home country of Chad and his country of exile, Senegal had previously failed. Belgium, however, is one of the countries known for its extensive use of universal jurisdiction.

In short, the idea behind universal jurisdiction is that there are some norms in public international law that are widely accepted to a degree that they have become binding for everyone (jus cogens). Consequently, a violation of these norms is considered a crime against the entire community of states or even humanity as such. These so called erga omnes norms include bans of genocide, slavery, torture and racial discrimination.

In the 2000’s a trend to prosecute foreign government officials in national courts through universal jurisdiction began to emerge. Diplomatic rows stemming from these court cases led to countries like Spain and Belgium limiting the use of universal jurisdiction in their courts. Indeed, the case of Habré was one of the last large-scale universal jurisdiction cases accepted in Belgium, the result of naturalised Belgian citizens who had been victims pursuing the case.

Reed Brody from Human Rights Watch recovering documents connected to Habré's crimes in Chad (Reed Brody)

Belgium has meanwhile filed for the extradition of Habré four times. Three of the requests have been denied while the latest is still pending. Senegalese courts themselves have so far dismissed prosecuting Habré, declaring themselves as not competent in the case, apparently under the pressure of the current Senegalese President Abdoulaye Wade. Continue reading

Posted in African Union (AU), Belgium, Chad, Crimes against humanity, Exile, Justice, Universal Jurisdiction | Tagged , , , , , , , | 9 Comments